Publicerad 17 september 2015
Konkurrens, Working Paper, 2015:1
Economics of Payment Cards. Authors: Ozlem Bedre-Defolie and Linda Gratz
This article summarizes the literature on two-sided payment card markets. The general conclusion is that interchange fees can help internalize the complementarity between services on both sides of the market but private platforms set too high interchange fees from a social welfare perspective.
Private platforms' price structure is distored in favor of buyers for several reasons: asymmetric choices between buyers and merchants, merchant internalization and/or platform competition. Furthermore, market power of platforms leads to higher total user prices similar to the case of one-sided markets. Platform competition can help to correct for such market power distortions but may exacerbate the price structure distortions.
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