Working paper-serie

I serien "Working paper" presenterar Konkurrensverket pågående forskning med anknytning till det konkurrenspolitiska området.

Serien har som syfte att sprida forskning och metodarbete som är av intresse för myndigheter, forskare och andra intressenter inom konkurrenspolitik, både inom Sverige och internationellt.

De synpunkter och åsikter som framförs av författarna representerar deras egna uppfattningar och återspeglar inte nödvändigtvis Konkurrensverkets uppfattning.

Serien publiceras endast på engelska.

Ytterligare information

Har du frågor om Konkurrensverkets Working paper-serie, hör av dig till
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, biträdande chefsekonom, sven-olof.fridolfsson@kkv.se

Publicerade Working Paper

Stepping up the game. The role of innovation in the sharing economy. Author: Vera Demary

KONKURRENS, FORSKNING, WORKING PAPER, 2017 Digitization is fanning out over all sectors of the economy. This involves an increasing utilization of digital technologies as well as the development of new business models. Online platforms are the most popular example for the latter. They match supply and demand for a service and are thus able to cut transaction costs tremendously.

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The sharing economy is one application of the online platform business model that is deemed particularly innovative. What makes up this innovativeness from an economic viewpoint has not been analyzed so far, however. This paper reviews different concepts of innovation and discusses their relevance for the sharing economy.

Serie: Working Paper 2017:1
Publicerad: 2017-05-02
Antal sidor: 22

Stepping up the game. The role of innovation in the sharing economy.pdf (0,2 MB)

UPP Analysis in Five Recent Merger Cases. Authors: Apostolos Baltzopoulos, Jaewon Kim and Martin Mandorff

KONKURRENS, FORSKNING, WORKING PAPER, 2015 A recent development in merger review has been the shift from an approach committed to market definitions, market shares and concentration index appraisals to more effect-based analyses.

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This paper attempts to provide an all-in-one guide for practitioners who are interested in getting a full grasp of how the UPP framework has been developed and how to apply it. In this paper we review and summarize the underpinnings of what has become a popular tool in identifying potentially problematic mergers, known as the Upwards Pricing Pressure (UPP) methodology and discuss how it has been applied in five recent cases reviewed by Konkurrensverket (the Swedish Competition Authority).

Serie: Working Paper 2015:3
Publicerad: 2015-09-17
Antal sidor: 48

UPP Analysis in Five Recent Merger Cases. Authors: Apostolos Baltzopoulos, Jaewon Kim and Martin Mandorff.pdf (0,9 MB)

Enforcing Margin Squeeze Ex Post Across Converging Telecommunications Markets. Authors: Christian Bergqvist and John Townsend

KONKURRENS, FORSKNING, WORKING PAPER, 2015 A margin squeeze is an exclusionary abuse which occurs when a vertically integrated telecoms operator creates a disparity between upstream and downstream prices with the intention of squeezing an access competitor’s profits. The purpose of such pricing is either to increase the latter’s entry costs, delay profitability or limit their ability to remain or expand on markets.

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However, traditional market definitions are being challenged by (1) the technological convergence of services and (2) innovative product offerings taking advantage of this convergence. Consumers now routinely purchase a bundle of telecoms services with a single payment (known as ‘quad play’), including fixed and mobile voice calls, broadband connectivity, and premium broadcasting content. How should such unilateral conduct be assessed ex post by a competition authority under Article 102 TFEU? We suggest that convergence and innovation present both theoretical and practical difficulties for assessing “muddled margins” on telecoms markets. New and different enforcement approaches to exclusion will have to be formulated within the Article 102 framework and tested in the Courts. This may even require abstaining from applying Article 102 TFEU during material periods of convergence, and confining ex post enforcement activity to sector regulation, even when this is inferior for safeguarding effective competition.

Serie: Working Paper 2015:2
Publicerad: 2015-09-17
Antal sidor: 33

Enforcing Margin Squeeze Ex Post Across Converging Telecommunications Markets. Authors: Christian Bergqvist and John Townsend.pdf (0,9 MB)

Economics of Payment Cards. Authors: Ozlem Bedre-Defolie and Linda Gratz

KONKURRENS, FORSKNING, WORKING PAPER, 2015 This article summarizes the literature on two-sided payment card markets. The general conclusion is that interchange fees can help internalize the complementarity between services on both sides of the market but private platforms set too high interchange fees from a social welfare perspective.

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Private platforms' price structure is distored in favor of buyers for several reasons: asymmetric choices between buyers and merchants, merchant internalization and/or platform competition. Furthermore, market power of platforms leads to higher total user prices similar to the case of one-sided markets. Platform competition can help to correct for such market power distortions but may exacerbate the price structure distortions.

Serie: Working Paper 2015:1
Publicerad: 2015-09-17
Antal sidor: 34

Economics of Payment Cards. Authors: Ozlem Bedre-Defolie and Linda Gratz.pdf (0,6 MB)

Heterogeneous Penalties and Private Information. Author: Catarina Marvao

KONKURRENS, FORSKNING, WORKING PAPER, 2014 The theoretical framework of the adequacy or otherwise of fine reductions under the EU and US Leniency Programmes has been explored widely. However, the characteristics of the reporting cartel members remain unexplained. This is the first paper to develop a model where cartel members are heterogeneous in terms of the cartel fine and have private information on the probability of conviction.

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It is shown that firms which receive higher fines, have a lower equilibrium threshold for reporting. To validate this result and analyze the sources of fine heterogeneity, data for EU and US cartels are used. Being the first reporter is shown to be correlated with recidivism, leadership and reductions received outside the Leniency Programme. Some characteristics of the cartels where reporting occurred are also unveiled. Identifying the characteristics of the reporting firms is vital to dissolve and dissuade cartels and the wider policy implications of these findings are discussed in the paper.

Serie: Working Paper 2014:1
Antal sidor: 44

Heterogeneous Penalties and Private Information. Author Catarina Marvao.pdf (0,4 MB)